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Abstract
The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the
provision of a public good. In an incomplete contracting framework, Besley
and Ghatak (2001) have argued that the party who values the public good most
should be the owner. We show that this conclusion relies on their assumption
that the parties split the renegotiation surplus 50:50. If the generalized Nash
bargaining solution is applied, then for any pair of valuations that the two
parties may have, there exist bargaining powers such that either ownership by
the government or by the NGO can be optimal.
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1 Introduction
According to the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (Grossman
and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995), when only incomplete con-
tracts can be written, investment incentives are determined by the ownership
structure. The optimal ownership structure depends on technological aspects.
Specifically, in an otherwise symmetric setting, a party should be the owner if
its investments have the largest marginal returns.
In a remarkable contribution, Besley and Ghatak (2001) have applied the
property rights approach to discuss who should own public goods.1 They
consider two parties (the government and a non-governmental organization)
who can make non-contractible investments. It turns out that the party who
values the public good most should be the owner, regardless of technological
aspects.
Besley and Ghatak (2001) assume that the government and the NGO have
equal bargaining powers; i.e., they apply the regular Nash bargaining solution
so that the renegotiation surplus is split 50:50. In the present paper, we analyze
what happens if the generalized Nash bargaining solution is applied, so that
the parties’ bargaining powers may diﬀer.
It turns out that then for any pair of valuations of the public good that
the two parties may have, there exist bargaining powers such that either own-
ership by the government or by the NGO can be optimal. In particular, if the
government (NGO) has all the bargaining power, then ownership by the NGO
(government) is optimal.
1In related settings, Halonen-Akatwijuka and Pafilis (2009) study repeated games,
Halonen-Akatwijuka (2012) considers indispensable agents, Francesconi and Muthoo (2011)
allow for impure public goods, and Schmitz (2012) introduces asymmetric information.
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2 The model
There are two parties, G (the government) and N (a non-governmental orga-
nization). At some initial date 0, the parties agree on an ownership structure
o ∈ {G,N}. At date 1, the parties G and N simultaneously make observable
but non-contractible investments g ≥ 0 and n ≥ 0, respectively. Following the
incomplete contracting approach, it is assumed that ex ante the public good
which can be produced with the help of the investments is not yet contractible.2
At date 2, the provision of the public good becomes contractible. If the
two parties agree to collaborate at date 2, they together produce the quantity
y(g) + ξy(n) of the public good,3 where y(0) = 0, y0(0) = ∞, y0(∞) = 0,
y00 < 0, and ξ > 0. The parameter ξ indicates whether the government (ξ < 1)
or the non-governmental organization (ξ > 1) has a technological advantage
in producing the public good.
If the parties do not collaborate at date 2, the quantity of the public good
depends on the ownership structure. Specifically, in case of disagreement be-
tween the parties, the quantity of the public good is y(g) + λξy(n) if o = G
and λy(g) + ξy(n) if o = N , where λ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, while the owner can
always realize the full returns of his investments, in case of disagreement he
can realize only a fraction λ of the returns of the other party’s investments
(cf. Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997).
The government’s valuation of the public good is given by θG > 0, while
the non-governmental organization’s valuation is given by θN > 0. Thus, in
line with Besley and Ghatak (2001), the parties’ payoﬀs are as illustrated in
2See Hart and Moore (1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999), and Tirole (1999) for discussions
of the incomplete contracting paradigm.
3Note that we frame the model in terms of quantities of the public good, while Besley
and Ghatak (2001) frame their model in terms of benefits. Whether the model is framed in
terms of quantities or benefits makes no economic diﬀerence.
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Table 1, where t is a (positive or negative) transfer payment from party N to
party G.
payoﬀ of party G payoﬀ of party N
collaboration θG[y(g) + ξy(n)] + t θN [y(g) + ξy(n)]− t
default, o = G θG[y(g) + λξy(n)] θN [y(g) + λξy(n)]
default, o = N θG[λy(g) + ξy(n)] θN [λy(g) + ξy(n)]
Table 1. The parties’ payoﬀs.
Besley and Ghatak (2001) model the outcome of the ex post negotiations
using the regular Nash bargaining solution, so that the renegotiation surplus
is split 50:50. In contrast, we model the outcome of the date-2 negotiations
using the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where π ∈ [0, 1] denotes party
N ’s bargaining power.
In the incomplete contracting literature, it is useful to make a clear distinc-
tion between a party’s bargaining position (which refers to the default payoﬀ
and is aﬀected by the ownership structure) and a party’s bargaining power
(which refers to the share of the ex post renegotiation surplus that a party
gets). The bargaining position thus corresponds to the disagreement point.
While in the regular Nash bargaining solution it is assumed that both parties
have the same bargaining power (π = 1/2), in the generalized Nash bargaining
solution any π ∈ [0, 1] is allowed.4 In some contributions to the incomplete
contracting literature, it is for simplicity assumed that π = 1/2 (for exam-
ple, see Hart, 1995) or π = 1 (for example, see the main part of Hart and
Moore, 1999). By now, several papers allow for any π ∈ [0, 1].5 A simple
4In any case, it is a central assumption of the property rights approach that the bargaining
power π is independent of the ownership structure (see Hart, 1995, footnote 17).
5For example, see Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998), the appendix of Hart and Moore (1999),
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non-cooperative foundation for the generalized Nash bargaining solution is a
bargaining game in which one party can make a take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀer with
probability π, while the other party can make a take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀer with
probability 1 − π (see the appendix of Hart and Moore, 1999). If one mod-
els the bargaining process as a full-fledged alternating-oﬀers game following
Rubinstein (1982), then the bargaining power π can be derived endogenously;
in this case it depends on the parties’ relative time preferences. Specifically,
when a party is relatively more patient, then it has a larger bargaining power.6
In accordance with the generalized Nash bargaining solution, the parties
will always collaborate and they agree on a transfer payment t such that at
date 2 each party gets its default payoﬀ (which it would get in case of disagree-
ment) plus a share of the renegotiation surplus (i.e., the additional surplus that
is generated by collaboration). The shares are determined by the parties’ bar-
gaining powers. Thus, if o = G, then party G’s date-2 payoﬀ is given by
uGG(g, n) = θG[y(g) + λξy(n)] + (1− π)∆G(n)
and party N ’s date-2 payoﬀ reads
uGN(g, n) = θN [y(g) + λξy(n)] + π∆
G(n),
where the renegotiation surplus that the parties divide at date 2 is given by
∆G(n) = (θG + θN)[y(g) + ξy(n)− [y(g) + λξy(n)]]
= (θG + θN)(1− λ)ξy(n).
Che and Hausch (1999), Antràs and Helpman (2004), Schmitz (2006), Ohlendorf (2009),
Hoppe and Schmitz (2010), or Ganglmair et al. (2012).
6If in an alternating-oﬀers game a player does not accept an oﬀer and instead makes a
counteroﬀer, then the player has to incur the cost of waiting. The smaller is her discount
rate, the smaller is this cost. Hence, being more patient confers greater bargaining power.
See e.g. Muthoo (1999) for a comprehensive textbook exposition.
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Observe that the renegotiation surplus in case of G-ownership depends on
party N ’s investment only. Note that the transfer payment on which the
parties contractually agree at date 2 is t = [(1− π)θN − πθG](1− λ)ξy(n).
Analogously, if o = N , then the parties’ date-2 payoﬀs are given by
uNG (g, n) = θG[λy(g) + ξy(n)] + (1− π)∆N(g)
and
uNN(g, n) = θN [λy(g) + ξy(n)] + π∆
N(g),
respectively, where the renegotiation surplus is given by
∆N(g) = (θG + θN)[y(g) + ξy(n)− [λy(g) + ξy(n)]]
= (θG + θN)(1− λ)y(g).
Note that in case of N-ownership, the renegotiation surplus depends on party
G’s investment only. The transfer payment on which the parties contractually
agree at date 2 is now t = [(1− π)θN − πθG](1− λ)y(g).
3 The first-best benchmark
Note that in a first-best world, the parties would always collaborate ex post.
Since then the total date-2 surplus is given by (θG + θN)[y(g) + ξy(n)], the
first-best investment levels are implicitly characterized by
(θG + θN)y0(gFB) = 1
and
(θG + θN)ξy0(nFB) = 1.
4 The second-best solution
We can now analyze the parties’ investment incentives in the incomplete con-
tracting world. Given ownership structure o ∈ {G,N}, at date 1 party G
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chooses the investment level
go = argmaxuoG(g, n)− g
and party N chooses the investment level
no = argmaxuoN(g, n)− n.
Hence, under G-ownership, the investment levels are implicitly character-
ized by
θGy0(gG) = 1
and
[θNλ+ π(θG + θN)(1− λ)]ξy0(nG) = 1.
Under N-ownership, the investment levels are characterized by
[θGλ+ (1− π)(θG + θN)(1− λ)]y0(gN) = 1
and
θNξy0(nN) = 1.
Note that there is always underinvestment with regard to the first-best so-
lution. Given concavity of the total surplus, this implies that if the investment
levels of both parties are larger in one of the ownership structures, then at
date 0 the parties will unambiguously agree on this ownership structure.
Now observe that party G invests more under G-ownership than under N-
ownership (gG > gN) whenever θG > θGλ+ (1− π)(θG + θN)(1− λ), which is
equivalent to πθG > (1− π)θN .
Moreover, partyN invests more underG-ownership than underN-ownership
(nG > nN) whenever θNλξ + π(θG + θN)(1 − λ)ξ > θNξ, which can also be
rewritten as πθG > (1− π)θN .
Thus, the following results hold.
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Proposition 1 Let party N ’s bargaining power be given by π. If πθG > (1−
π)θN , then the optimal ownership structure is o = G. If πθG < (1 − π)θN ,
then the optimal ownership structure is o = N .
Corollary 1 (i) Suppose π = 1/2. Then the party who values the public good
most should be the owner.
(ii) For any given values of θG and θN , the ownership structure o = G is
optimal when party N ’s bargaining power π is suﬃciently large, while o = N
is optimal if π is suﬃciently small.
(iii) The optimal ownership structure does not depend on the technology
parameter ξ.
The results thus show that the central finding of Besley and Ghatak (2001),
according to which the public good should be owned by the party who values
it most, crucially relies on their assumption that π = 1/2. In general, if the
government has all the bargaining power, then ownership should be allocated
to the NGO. Analogously, if the NGO has all the bargaining power, then the
government should be the owner.
Intuitively, increasing the NGO’s bargaining power π makes G-ownership
relatively more attractive. The reason is that under o = G, the renegotiation
surplus ∆G(n) depends on the NGO’s investment only, so that increasing π
has no eﬀect on the government’s investment incentives, while the NGO’s
investment incentives go up. Moreover, under N-ownership the renegotiation
surplus∆N(g) depends on the government’s investment only, so that increasing
π has no eﬀect on the NGO’s investment incentives, while the government’s
investment incentives decrease.7
7Specifically, consider the case π = 1. Under G-ownership, the investment levels
are characterized by θGy0(gG) = 1 and [(1 − λ)θG + θN ]ξy0(nG) = 1, while under N -
ownership they are characterized by θGλy0(gN ) = 1 and θNξy0(nN ) = 1. Hence, both
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Taken together, our findings imply that the important diﬀerence between
the property rights approach with private goods and public goods is not Besley
and Ghatak’s (2001) observation that in the latter case ownership should al-
ways be allocated to the party that values the public good most, because
this observation is true only in the special case in which the government and
the NGO have equal bargaining powers. The important diﬀerence between
the standard private good setting and Besley and Ghatak’s (2001) public good
setting is the fact that in the latter case it is irrelevant whether the government
or the NGO has a technological advantage.8
5 Conclusion
The property rights approach based on incomplete contracts, which is the
leading paradigm in the modern theory of the firm, can also be very useful to
throw light on optimal ownership structures in the context of public goods.
Yet, the pioneering work of Besley and Ghatak (2001), according to which a
public good should always be owned by the party who values it most, may
be misleading. In particular in the context of LDCs, the government and the
NGOmay well have quite diﬀerent bargaining powers. In this case, it may well
be optimal to allocate ownership to the party who has less bargaining power
ex post, even if this party does not have a larger valuation for the public good.
the government and the NGO have stronger incentives to invest under o = G. Next,
consider the case π = 0. Under G-ownership, the investment levels are characterized by
θGy0(gG) = 1 and θNλξy0(nG) = 1, while under N -ownership they are characterized by
[θG + (1− λ)θN ]y0(gN ) = 1 and θNξy0(nN ) = 1. Thus, both the government and the NGO
have stronger investment incentives under o = N .
8See, however, Halonen-Akatwijuka (2012) for an interesting recent contribution showing
that technological factors can play a role even in the case of public goods.
9
References
Antràs, P., Helpman, E., 2004. Global sourcing. Journal of Political Economy
112, 552—580.
Besley, T., Ghatak, M., 2001. Government versus private ownership of public
goods. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 1343—1372.
Che, Y.-K., Hausch, D.B., 1999. Cooperative investments and the value of
contracting. American Economic Review 89, 125—147.
Francesconi, M., Muthoo, A., 2011. Control rights in complex partnerships.
Journal of the European Economic Association 9, 551—589.
Ganglmair, B., Froeb, L.M., Werden, G.J., 2012. Patent hold-up and an-
titrust: How a well-intentioned rule could retard innovation. Journal of
Industrial Economics 60, 249—273.
Grossman, S.J., Hart, O.D., 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: A
theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy
94, 691—719.
Halonen-Akatwijuka, M., 2012. Nature of human capital, technology and
ownership of public goods. Journal of Public Economics, article in press,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.07.005.
Halonen-Akatwijuka, M., Pafilis, E., 2009. Reputation and ownership of pub-
lic goods. University of Bristol, CMPO Working Paper 09/211.
Hart, O.D., 1995. Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure. Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Hart, O.D., Moore, J., 1990. Property rights and the nature of the firm.
Journal of Political Economy 98, 1119—1158.
10
Hart, O., Moore, J., 1999. Foundations of incomplete contracts. Review of
Economic Studies 66, 115—138.
Hart, O., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. The proper scope of government:
theory and application to prisons. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112,
1127—1161.
Hoppe, E.I., Schmitz, P.W., 2010. Public versus private ownership: Quan-
tity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks. Journal of Public
Economics 94, 258—268.
Maskin, E., Tirole, J., 1999. Unforeseen contingencies, property rights, and
incomplete contracts. Review of Economic Studies 66, 83—114.
Muthoo, A., 1999. Bargaining Theory with Applications. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Nöldeke, G., Schmidt, K.M., 1998. Sequential investments and options to
own. Rand Journal of Economics 29, 633—653.
Ohlendorf, S., 2009. Expectation damages, divisible contracts, and bilateral
investment. American Economic Review 99, 1608—1618.
Rubinstein, A., 1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Economet-
rica 50, 97—109.
Schmitz, P.W., 2006. Information gathering, transaction costs, and the prop-
erty rights approach. American Economic Review 96, 422—434.
Schmitz, P.W., 2012. Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmet-
ric information. Economics Letters 117, 642—645.
Tirole, J., 1999. Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand? Econometrica
67, 741—781.
11
